Bridge collapse, 1940, Tacoma, Washington
(University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections)
(University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections)
Lucy Suchman opens her book, Plans and Situated
Actions: The Problem of Human-machine Communication, by comparing different
navigation methods employed by European and Trukese navigators. “The European navigator begins with a plan –
a course – which he has charted according to certain universal principles, and
he carries out his voyage by relating his every move to that plan. His effort
throughout his voyage is directed to remaining ‘on course.’ If unexpected events occur, he must first
alter the plan, then respond accordingly.”
The Trukese navigator, on the other hand, “…begins with an objective rather than a plan. He sets off towards the objective and responds to conditions as they arise in an ad hoc fashion.” The Trukese navigator steers according to information provided by the wind, tide, stars, clouds, and the sound of water on the side of his boat. While his objective is clear from the outset, his actual course is contingent on the unique circumstances that he cannot anticipate in advance. “His effort is directed to doing whatever needed to reach the objective. If asked, he can point to his objective at any moment, but he cannot describe his course.”
Suchman asserts the European navigator exemplifies the prevailing cognitive science model of purposeful action and “… the view that purposeful action is determined by plans is deeply rooted in the Western human sciences as the correct model of the rational actor… My own contention, however, is that as students of human action, we ignore the Trukese navigator at our peril.”1
The following two stories demonstrate how adopting the “navigation philosophy” (either of the Trukese’s or the European’s) affects how one copes with failures during project implementation. The first story is told by David Panhorst, an R&D manager at Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC):
The Trukese navigator, on the other hand, “…begins with an objective rather than a plan. He sets off towards the objective and responds to conditions as they arise in an ad hoc fashion.” The Trukese navigator steers according to information provided by the wind, tide, stars, clouds, and the sound of water on the side of his boat. While his objective is clear from the outset, his actual course is contingent on the unique circumstances that he cannot anticipate in advance. “His effort is directed to doing whatever needed to reach the objective. If asked, he can point to his objective at any moment, but he cannot describe his course.”
Suchman asserts the European navigator exemplifies the prevailing cognitive science model of purposeful action and “… the view that purposeful action is determined by plans is deeply rooted in the Western human sciences as the correct model of the rational actor… My own contention, however, is that as students of human action, we ignore the Trukese navigator at our peril.”1
The following two stories demonstrate how adopting the “navigation philosophy” (either of the Trukese’s or the European’s) affects how one copes with failures during project implementation. The first story is told by David Panhorst, an R&D manager at Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC):
…I managed the development of the Army’s first smart
tank bullet. The projectile’s built-in sensor searches the ground for targets.
Upon locating a target, the sensor aims and triggers a warhead to hit and
defeat the target from above, where it is most vulnerable. This fly-over,
shoot-down technique differs from the hit-to-defeat method used by current tank
ammunition.
The first two iterations of fin design tests failed
miserably. Since David had budgeted only for two iterations, more tests would
have resulted in higher costs for the project. To contain cost growth, David authorized
additional test objectives as part of the fin retest. The problem with having
so many layers of test objectives, however, was that with each failure, all
subsequent test data were lost. Nevertheless, the team pressed on and continued
to add bells and whistles to each successive redesign test until they had
gathered enough data on other subsystems to solve the problem.
It wasn’t until
we stopped and regrouped that we were able to refocus on the original objective and concentrate on the fin deployment problem, which,
after all, is the first thing that needs to happen. By refocusing our efforts
on the primary objective, we fixed the problem and developed a fin that opened
reliably and predictably.
Following this project David reflected: As children,
the first lesson we learned when we were introduced to ball sports, such as
baseball or tennis, was “Keep your eye on the ball.” In project management, it
is no different, you must maintain project focus. In our case, we should have
focused on validating the project concept rather than minimizing test cost. 2
Terry Little from the U.S. Air Force suggests a completely
different way of coping with such failures during project implementation:
We had a test where a warhead didn’t go off. The
flight of the cruise missile was perfect, but the warhead didn’t go off. You
could look at this and say, “Well that’s just one little piece of it.”
But if the warhead doesn’t go off, you don’t have a weapon.
In this case, we quickly determined that there was a
design problem with the fuse, and we moved on to have a successful retest—but
not before we mined every bit of information that we possibly could out of that
failure.
Whenever there
is a failure, the first thing to do is to go through a short grieving period. On JASSM [Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile],
whenever we had a failure, I allowed grieving for one day. We could grieve and mope, get
drunk, wring our hands, say “ain’t it awful.” We could do that for one
day, and then it was time to put it behind us. That’s a Terry Little rule.
… When you have a problem on a project, all of a sudden people
want to know, ‘What’s going on? What’s the problem?’ Most project managers want
those questions to go away, so there is a tendency to want to jump to the
solution and respond, “Don’t worry, we’ve got this in hand. It was just one of
those things.”
What you need to do is dig until you get to the root
cause of the problem, until you are certain that you understand why this
failure happened. Yes, it takes a little longer. Yes, it costs more money. In
my case, a week to get to the root cause of a problem is $4 or $5 million. But
you’ve got to do it, so that when you move forward you know that you have
learned from the failure. A lot of times what caused it will be a gnat, but you
should still kill it with a sledgehammer and smash it to bits until you are
convinced that, though you may have other failures in the future, that
particular one will never occur again—ever. You can’t move forward from
a failure if you’re worried about repeating the same mistake.3
These
two stories present two strikingly different management philosophies.
Following the European navigator approach, David Panhorst was too concerned
with the original test plan (which called for only two iterations of design
tests), rather than focusing on the objective of the project (“to develop a fin
that opened reliably and predictably”). More importantly, he was reluctant to modify
the original plan. In contrast, Terry Little quickly modified the plan in order
to spend the necessary time mining “every bit of information” from the failure.
Like the Trukese navigator, Little’s primary focus was on the objectives: “… if
the warhead doesn’t go off, you don’t have a weapon.” In so doing, Little
exhibited that a focus on objectives requires a readiness to modify the
plans leading to those objectives!
1 Suchman.
1987. Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-machine Communication.
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, vii. Suchman refers to a story,
quoted by G. Berreman, which was written by T. Gladwin in 1964. L.G. Berreman.
1966. Anemic and Emetic Analyses in Social Anthropology. American
Anthropologist 86, 2: 346-54. T. Gladwin. 1964. Culture and logical process. In
Explorations in Cultural Anthropology: Essays Presented to George Peter
Murdock, ed. W. Goodenough. New York,
NY: McGraw Hill.
2 “Keep
Your Eye on the Ball,” David Panhorst, ARDEC. 2000. In A. Laufer and E.J. Hoffman,
Project Management Success Stories, 131-33. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
3 “A Terry Little Rule,” Terry Little, U.S. Air
Force. 2005. In A. Laufer, T. Post, and
E.J. Hoffman, Shared Voyage: Learning and Unlearning from Remarkable
Projects, 123-24. Washington, DC: The NASA History Series.
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